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The Roles of Cost Sharing Rules and Well Sharing in Irrigation Inefficiency:
A Case Study in Groundwater Pumping in Mexico
Market Report
Livestock and Products,
Weekly Average
Nebraska Slaughter Steers,
35-65% Choice, Live Weight. . . . . . .
Nebraska Feeder Steers,
Med. & Large Frame, 550-600 lb. . . . .
Nebraska Feeder Steers,
Med. & Large Frame 750-800 lb. . .. .
Choice Boxed Beef,
600-750 lb. Carcass. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Western Corn Belt Base Hog Price
Carcass, Negotiated. . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
Pork Carcass Cutout, 185 lb. Carcass
51-52% Lean. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Slaughter Lambs, wooled and shorn,
135-165 lb. National. . . . . . .
National Carcass Lamb Cutout
FOB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Crops,
Daily Spot Prices
Wheat, No. 1, H.W.
Imperial, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Corn, No. 2, Yellow
Nebraska City, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Soybeans, No. 1, Yellow
Nebraska City, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .
Grain Sorghum, No.2, Yellow
Dorchester, cwt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Oats, No. 2, Heavy
Minneapolis, Mn, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Feed
Alfalfa, Large Square Bales,
Good to Premium, RFV 160-185
Northeast Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . .
Alfalfa, Large Rounds, Good
Platte Valley, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grass Hay, Large Rounds, Good
Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .
Dried Distillers Grains, 10% Moisture
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wet Distillers Grains, 65-70% Moisture
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
⃰ No Market
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78.16
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146.30

158.67
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257.10

6.56

4.93

5.09

4.43

3.45

3.71

14.05

8.99
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90.00
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52.00

41.00

Concerns about groundwater depletion in the High
Plains Aquifer and other aquifers throughout the
world have been well documented in the media and
the scientific literature. A recent study found that
groundwater use exceeds recharge in about one-third
of the world’s largest aquifers (Barringer, 2015). Thus,
developing appropriate groundwater management
policies that encourage conservation and preserve the
long-run viability of aquifers is of paramount importance in many regions. However, policies and institutional arrangements in many areas may exacerbate aquifer depletion by encouraging groundwater
consumption. Policies that subsidize the cost of energy
inputs may increase groundwater extraction. Subsidized electricity or diesel rates for irrigators are pervasive in many countries including India, Mexico, and
Tunisia (among many others). Concerns about neighbors using groundwater and depleting a shared aquifer may lead to all irrigators using more water than if
the aquifer was not shared. Using inefficiently large
amounts of groundwater is a concern as it can lead to
the depletion of existing aquifers and an increase in
future costs as groundwater tables are drawn down.
In a recent study we use data from Mexico to examine
the effect of three characteristics of groundwater use.
Specifically, we examine the effect of well sharing, cost
sharing, and energy subsidies on the efficiency of
groundwater use. The data was collected during the
2003 – 2004 winter season by the Instituto Nacional
de Ecología y Cambio Climático (National Institute of
Ecology and Climate Change). Two surveys were used
to collect data for each well. The first survey includes
questions about the irrigation unit (e.g., number of
farmers sharing the well, crops grown by producers).
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The second crop-specific survey was completed for each of
the main crops grown using water from the well. The cropspecific survey includes questions about inputs (including
irrigation), yields, and prices for each crop. All of the wells
in the sample use only groundwater for irrigation and natural precipitation without any supplemental surface water
diversions

groundwater use. It is important to note that simply
using a large amount of groundwater is not necessarily
undesirable if that water use is associated with a high
level of production. We account for this in our analysis
by examining water use relative to total yield. We develop three hypotheses based on studies from other
locations and economic modeling.

Irrigation well characteristics:

First, we hypothesize that eliminating electricity subsidies will not make a large difference in groundwater
use. While we will test this with the data from our sample, studies in other places have generally found a small
price response in irrigation water use (Hendricks and
Peterson, 2012). Second, we hypothesize that a greater
number of farmers sharing a well will increase the inefficiency of irrigation application. This is based on previous work that has found a strategic relationship in
farmer pumping decisions (Pfeiffer and Lin, 2012).
Third, we hypothesize that farmers with equal cost
sharing or land-based cost sharing will use groundwater more inefficiently than those who pay the full cost
of their water consumption (i.e., those with cost sharing based on the duration of irrigation).

Well sharing: In contrast to the independently owned and
operated groundwater wells of the High Plains, it is very
common in many countries for multiple producers to share
a single groundwater well. This is the situation in much of
Mexico, as many producers own or use small plots of land,
and individually owned irrigation wells are technically inefficient and prohibitively costly. We use a randomly chosen
sample of 197 irrigation wells in our study. Of the 197 wells,
77 (39.1 percent) are owned by a single user while the rest
are shared by multiple farmers. The 120 shared wells have a
median of 6 users and an average of 12 users.
Cost sharing: When multiple farmers share an irrigation
well they need to choose how to divide the costs associated
with paying for the electricity necessary to pump groundwater. There are three methods used to share those costs:
equal cost sharing, land based cost sharing, and irrigation
time based cost sharing. With the first method farmers split
the electricity costs equally (e.g., if 5 farmers share the well,
each one pays 20 percent of the electricity bill). With the
second method farmers split the electricity costs based on
the amount of land irrigated. For example, if two farmers
share a well and the first plants 10 acres while the second
plants 20 acres, the first will pay one-third of the bill and the
second will pay two-thirds of the bill. With the last method
farmers split the electricity costs based on the number of
hours each one irrigates. For example, if two farmers share a
well and the first irrigates for 10 hours per week while the
second irrigates for 20 hours per week, the first will pay one
-third of the bill and the second will pay two-thirds of the
bill. Of the 120 shared wells 30 divide the costs equally for
all users (method one), 45 share costs on the amount of
land farmed (method two), and 45 share costs on total
hours of irrigation use (method three).
Electricity subsidies: Electricity is the primary cost of pumping groundwater in all of the wells included in the study.
While subsidies in Mexico have been reduced since the
study period, they have not been eliminated. Removing
electricity subsidies is frequently advocated as a policy
change to encourage conservation of water resources. Our
study results allow us to estimate how much water use
would be reduced if electricity subsidies were eliminated.
Methods: Our goal in this study is to measure the impact of
these three characteristics on the efficiency of groundwater

To test these hypotheses we estimate the quantity of
groundwater irrigation used by all farmers who share
the well based on the three characteristics of interest.
We also include other control variables to account for
other things that affect water use. For example, we also
include information on climate conditions, average
education level, total output, soil type, and crop type.
However, we focus our discussion of results on the
characteristics of interest1.
Results: Our first hypothesis is that eliminating electricity subsidies will not have a large effect on groundwater use. We find evidence this is true in our sample.
Our estimates show that a 100 percent increase or doubling of water prices (i.e., electricity prices) will only
reduce groundwater use by 6 percent. So, while eliminating subsidies will have some effect on groundwater
use and aquifer depletion, that effect is extremely small.
Policymakers who are concerned about aquifer sustainability may find that other policy tools are more effective than subsidy elimination at encouraging conservation.
Our second hypothesis is that irrigation inefficiency is
greater when more farmers share a well. However, our
results fail to support this hypothesis. We investigate
this in several different ways such as including a subset
of the wells and including multiple indicators of the
___________________
More details on the estimation results and other variables are available from the corresponding author.

1

number of users. But, we find no empirical evidence from
our sample that irrigation wells shared by a greater number
of farmers are less efficient. While surprising, this result
may show that farmers who share a well are organized in
other decisions such as crops, acreage, and timing of irrigation use. It’s important to note that this result may not
hold worldwide. Other countries with shared wells may
not show the same result. But, this provides evidence that
well sharing is unlikely to be a major source of irrigation
inefficiency in Mexican irrigated agriculture.
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Our last hypothesis is related to cost sharing rules. Past
policy recommendations on improving the efficiency and
sustainability of groundwater have failed to recognize this
as an important issue for policymakers to address. However, our results support our hypothesis and show that cost
sharing rules are a major source of inefficiency in irrigation
application. We use the case where farmers pay the full
cost of their water use (i.e., volumetric pricing) as the base
case with an irrigation efficiency of 100 percent. Relative to
the base case, an equal cost share rule and a land based cost
share rule reduce irrigation efficiency to 58 and 73 percent,
respectively. Therefore, moving to volumetric pricing provides a substantially larger improvement in irrigation efficiency than eliminating or reducing electricity subsidies.
However, we caution that a thorough analysis of these benefits needs to incorporate the costs of implementing volumetric pricing, something we were unable to do in our
study.
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Summary and conclusion: We investigate the effect of multiple characteristics of shared wells on groundwater use
efficiency. While some of the characteristics (price, number
of users) have been studied in other areas, we do not know
of other work that has included cost sharing as a potentially important source of irrigation inefficiency. We find evidence that wells that use a cost sharing rule instead of volumetric pricing have greater irrigation inefficiency, and that
the difference is both statistically and economically significant. This provides evidence that policymakers should encourage users of shared wells to move away from arbitrary
cost sharing rules and toward rules that incorporate volumetric pricing.
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